Tonight I was having a conversation with my Dad about predestination (he is an Arminian, and I, Reformed). One of the issues he brought up was this: Even if we found out, say, that unconditional election were true, what difference would it make? How would it change or improve your relationship with God?
I quickly countered that the doctrine of Perseverance, at least, was a great comfort to many people who struggle with doubt and sin. He replied that the average Christian could be comforted in the same way, but from some other doctrine (this wasn't specified, but here's a likely example: Someone may be comforted in their salvation simply due to their belief that God is compassionate, but not that they are eternally secure). This got me thinking about some moral and epistemological issues, one of which I'd like to discuss here. The point of the following discussion is to demonstrate that correct Christian doctrine is profitable and important.
NOTE: The following discussion assumes that situations generally, and not just personal acts, can be characterized in a moral way. That is, the situation 'Jones' daughters are playing happily on the playground' is a morally good and valuable situation, though the children's acts of 'playing' may be considered morally indifferent.
Consider the following triad:
1. Person p believes q and experiences y as a direct result of q.
2. Person p believes q, experiences y as a direct result of q, and q is true.
3. Person p believes q, experiences y as a direct result of q, and q is false.
Both (2) and (3) are characterizations of (1). My question is this: Does (2) render (1) a maximally good state of affairs, does (3) render (1) a maximally good state of affairs, or are (2) and (3) indifferent to how we characterize (1) in terms of 'goodness'?
I think few and far between would answer with the second option. If he or she were a pragmatist, then the third option may suffice. But, barring pragmatism, I think most would agree that the first option is correct. That is, (2) renders (1) a maximally good state of affairs.
Now let's fill these propositions in with some everyday examples. Most could agree that, of the following three options, option (3) is the best:
1. Sally comes home and finds a cake baked for her. She believes (falsely) that her boyfriend Fred baked it due to a spontaneous act of kindness, and becomes grateful.
2. Sally comes home and finds a cake baked for her. She believes (falsely) that her boyfriend Fred baked it due to a fond rememberance of the day they met, and becomes grateful.
3. Sally comes home and finds a cake baked for her. She believes that her boyfriend Fred baked it due to the fact that it is their Anniversary (which is true), and becomes grateful.
Now, let's note a few things about each scenario. In scenario (1), Fred did not in fact do this as an act of spontaneous kindness. Yet, the product is the same: Sally is grateful. Not only is sally grateful, but she believes something good about Fred (namely, that he would perform a spontaneous act of kindness). Let us add also, that this is the sort of thing Fred in fact does from time to time! But in this case that motive had nothing to do with baking the cake for Sally. Now consider this: Fred proceeds to discover that Sally believes something false about his motive for baking the cake. Will he be as satisfied with her gratefulness, and the situation as a whole? Obviously, the answer is "No!". He thinks, and I think our moral intuitions support this, that the situation is "less good" then it could be (keep in mind that Sally is nonetheless morally innocent. The characterization of "goodness" is attributed merely to the situation itself).
In scenario (2), Fred's motive was not, in fact, that he experienced a fond rememberance of the day he and Sally met. This scenario is different, though, from (1) for the following reasons: It is likely that a fond rememberance of the day he and Sally met occured earlier in the day. In fact, it might have been a necessary component of his primary motive! That is, he might have had a fond rememberance of the day they met, it reminded him of their Anniversary, and he proceeded to bake the cake. The "Anniversary" itself may entail the fact, or even be equal to, 'the day Fred met Sally'. Nonetheless, she doesn't know the full truth about Fred's motive. And, therefore, were he to discover that she believed this falsehood (or semi-falsehood), he would be less satisfied with Sally's gratefulness, and the situation as a whole, then he could be. The situation is still, in other words, not 'maximally good'.
Thus it appears that scenario (3) becomes, with respect to the other two options, the 'maximally good' state of affairs. I think this can be agreed upon by most, and is at least more likely than it's negation. Therefore, let us accept it for the sake of furthering the discussion.
How does this then apply to various religious experiences, affections, and beliefs? Well, let's say that some person A believes that he or she need not worry about her salvation because God is loving and just. Let us assume also that she lacks a belief in eternal security, which, for the sake of argument, is a true belief. Now let's take an eagle-eye view and ponder this from God's perspective. He may be satisfied that A is comforted in his or she salvation, and that A believes God is loving and just. Indeed, she should believe God is loving and just, and that she can be confident in her salvation, for they are both true! Yet, I think God would still have the desire that A realize she can be confident in her salvation because she is eternally secure, kept by His power. God is just and loving, and His justice and love may even be the motivations for rendering A eternally secure. Nonetheless A lacks all of the relevant information appropriate to her confidence in salvation. Not only should she be confident in God's love and justice, but she also should be confident in His decree of her security! If she had all the information appropriate to her confidence, I think it is reasonable to assume God would deem this situation 'maximally good' (In the same way, Fred might be happy Sally was grateful for his rememberance of the day they met. But that was not all the information appropriate to his motive for baking the cake; namely, that it was their Anniversary).
So why assume a situation like this is 'maximally good', as opposed to the others? Here are three good reasons:
1. The person's belief is grounded in the truth appropriate to it.
2. The person will have knowledge of a truth, which is good in itself.
and
3. The person will likely benefit from this knowledge in a moral way (e.g., Sally will likely increase in her love for Fred's attentiveness to their romantic past, and they will grow. Or, person A will likely increase in his or her appreciation of God's power if A knows he or she is eternally secure).
So, how is this relevant? It is relevant because many Christians today do not care much for correct doctrine in any areas but essentials. I have demonstrated, however, that there are many situations in which correct doctrine about non-essentials is morally good, and in fact beneficial to your relationship with God in relevant ways. Not only this, but my argument implies that God in fact desires precision of doctrine in His followers, for the reasons noted above.
Under the Mercy,
- Ben C.
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