Some Thoughts on Events

In considering our ontology, I think that a distinct category we should include as being a part of it are what are commonly called 'events'. What is an event? Common examples include things like a bird flying, a man yelling, or a ball falling. Note that these examples, and virtually any other one might think of, contain present participles. And, even if they are gerunds, they still typically denote temporal states of affairs (Note: One may make an exception to this in considering certain gerunds or what one may call 'eternally-present participles', such as 'God has been eternally thinking'. But this is not an issue, as I am only trying to demonstrate that events tend to be associated with temporal states of affairs).

So then, what should we think of events? I think we should regard them as a certain kind of states of affairs. But what kind? What marks them out as distinct, say, from states of affairs like 'the car being red'? Given what I noted above concerning the temporal language usually associated with what we call 'events', I think we should regard them as states of affairs which are temporally located. We may put it formally as follows:

1a. For some state of affairs S, S is an event if and only if S obtains at some time t-n and ceases to obtain at some time t-x.

The question obviously arises as to whether we should consider certain timeless states of affairs as events. I think, though, that any examples of such states of affairs may be regarded properly, and reasonably, as 'states of affairs simpliciter'. And, consequently, states of affairs which temporally obtain in the sense defined in (1a) may be regarded as events. Also, keep in mind that (given actualism) states of affairs which are events don't need to exist temporally, they need only obtain temporally.

But wait. Isn't this still incomplete? Aren't there plenty of states of affairs which obtain temporally, but which are obviously not what we call events? For example, the aforementioned state of affairs 'the car being red'? A car being red, i.e. exemplifying redness, obtains temporally but isn't an event, it's just a temporally obtaining state of affairs. Consider the fact that the idea of a car being red remains coherent when rendered a timeless state of affairs ('the car has been exemplifying redness from eternity'). So then, we should ammend (1a), which is vague, to something more concise, like the following:

1b. For some state of affairs S, S is an event if and only if S necessarily obtains temporally.

Now we have made the claim stronger, and I think it an adequate account of events. Consider things like, 'kicking a ball', 'flying a kite', or 'eating a sandwich'. They all have a necessarily temporal nature. The idea of kicking a ball, flying a kite, or eating a sandwich timelessly seems incoherent. I think we can recognize why without exploring this further, but let's do so just for fun.

I think the reason things like 'kicking a ball', 'flying a kite', and etc. are necessarily temporal states of affairs is because they seem to refer to a certain kind of collection of states of affairs. Consider the example of kicking a ball. We may say it is the collection of the following states of affairs:

2a. Rearing one's leg back.
2b. One's foot making contact with the ball.
2c. The ball being located at spatial points x,...,y.

Individually, each of these states of affairs could exist timelessly (with the exception of 2b, which included various spatial points in sequence for convenience' sake, but you get the point). But, for 2a-2c to be considered as just one state of affairs, it seems that they must stand in some sort of causal relation to one another. But causal relations can only exist in time (using the term 'causal' in it's everyday sense, not in it's aristotelian 'explanatory' sense). And so, we may with even more conciseness say that events are collections of states of affairs which bear a causal relation to one another (2a bears an existing prior to relation to 2b, 2c bears an existing after relation to 2c, and so on and so forth).

Note: The difference between (2a) and (2b) is subtle, and I think it worth to clarify in modal terms. (2a) could be taken as "necessarily, it is possible that p be a q", as opposed to (2b) which can only be taken as "it is necessary that p be a q".