Some Thoughts on Free-Will

In my opinion, the problem of free-will is the single most difficult problem in philosophy. No matter what "theory" of human volition you turn to, whether determinism, compatibalism, or libertarianism, there seem to be insurmountable issues. Determinism seems to directly contradict our day to day experience of freely acting, and our language about moral culpability. Compatibalism seems to lead straight back to determinism, because acting based on reasons is to be determined by those reasons, and if not, those reasons themselves are at least determined by our experiences and etc. Libertarianism doesn't seem any better for, as several philosophers (most notably van Inwagen) have pointed out, it appears to make human action entirely random, like a game of luck.

So how is progress ever going to be made? Why are there no viable theories of free-will? I think part of the issue, if not the primary issue, is one that has to do with language. It seems to me that before the metaphysical debate has even gotten of the ground, we have failed to understand the nature of volition-talk. What do humans mean when they use terms like "choice", "free-will", "personal decision" and the like? I think that, while we take ourselves to be using such terms in a normative, coextensive way, we in fact use them in contexts that differ significantly (although they do bear a sort of Wittgensteinian family resemblance to one another, hence our feeling at liberty to use the same terms across the board).

So, for example, one of the situations in which we use volition-talk are situations that pertain to moral responsibility, or culpability. We say "It was his choice to fire the gun, no one made him do it!". In these sorts of contexts, our main point seems to be that a given person acted based on his or her own reasons, as opposed to being coerced or forced by another person. In other contexts, however, we use the same talk in a similar, but significantly different way. Say, for instance, you're driving through a fast food restaurant. You have several options on the menu before you. In the act of choosing what you want, you assume you have various, equally viable possible choices before you. Hence, you deliberate, knowing you could choose any one of the items on the menu. In this context, we find it natural to ascribe to the orderer a process of free-will. Why? Because the orderer really could've chosen among several alternate possibilities. Note, however, that upon philosophical analyses these two uses are inconsistent. For, if you act based on reasons, then you are determined by those reasons, and hence have no alternate possibilities to choose from. And if you did have alternate possibilities, then it would seem a choice between them would have to be random, since reason-determination is determination nonetheless (whether directly or, as I said, because you forming the reasons you have is out of your control).

The situation, then, seems to be the following: We use talk of free-will in situations that are similar, but upon philosophical analyses, the usages give rise to inconsistent ideas about what we mean by freedom of the will. But if free-will cannot be given a coherent, holistic definition, how can we ever make philosophical progress? I think the lesson here is that we have one of two options: (1) We could view the inconsistencies as paradoxes, not contradictions, and be content to say that free-will is ultimately a mystery; that is, that it can somehow be true both that our actions are determined by reasons, and that our actions could have been different after a given choice is made. Or, (2) we could take the inconsistencies to be a decisive blow against the idea of free-will so-construed. And we could then choose to move forward by providing a satisfactory account of what we mean by free-will, reducing the debate to one of metalinguistics. How this all would play out, I'm not sure. But I, for one, find the latter option the most attractive.

How then will we explain the fact that we use such talk in contexts and ways that are implicitly inconsistent? I think that we use the same terms because such contexts all resemble one another in the following way: They all have to do with personal, human action. And because such terms and ways of thinking have played the same functional role, and have served us equally well, throughout the evolution of human society, we have assumed we mean one holistic thing by them. But, as we have seen, there is no way to make consistent all the uses and concepts grouped under the one heading of "free-will".